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Abstract 
Even if we don’t like it, we often face counterexamples to the 
inferences we have made or would like to make. With the 
exception of the SimProb model (Blok, Medin & Osherson, 
2007), models of inductions to date have predominantly 
focused on the relevance of positive evidence to the inference 
process. Here we provide data from single and double 
premise arguments in a category-based property induction 
task using positive and negative evidence. A simple similarity 
model, the Similarity-Coverage model (Osherson et al., 1990) 
and the SimProb model are tested on negative and mixed 
evidence arguments.  
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The relevance of negative evidence  
Ever since Hume, induction has been an area of immense 
research efforts in philosophy (e.g., Goodman, 1955; 
Hempel, 1966; Lipton, 2004), psychology (e.g., Blok, 
Medin, & Osherson, 2007; Heit, 2000; Osherson et al., 
1990; Rehder, 2009; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 1993) and 
cognitive science (e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009) in 
general. Among the prominent questions studied have been: 
What is the logical basis for induction? What role does prior 
(semantic) knowledge play in inductive reasoning? Why are 
some kinds of fact more easily projectable than others? And 
how should we model inductive inference? Despite these 
extensive efforts less is known on the influence of negative 
evidence in induction.  
Negative evidence, however, is ubiquitous in everyday 
reasoning. In some circumstance, evidence may go against 
our established views. Your favorite restaurant serves you a 
bad meal, your friend, that is always late, shows up on time 
and your oh so reliable car won’t start. In other instances, 
you might be making a new inference with both positive and 
negative evidence present. You check out a new restaurant 
and receive a great starter and desert but a burned steak and 
overcooked vegetables. Negative evidence in category-
based property induction is defined here as evidence from 
an instance of the conclusion category that does not possess 
the to-be-projected property. In other words the evidence 
constitutes a clear counterexample of something possessing 
the to-be-projected property. The questions we would like to 
address here are: How does negative evidence affect our 
generalizations? What determines the relevance of negative 
evidence? How do we combine evidence to reach a 
conclusion? 
In research on induction involving positive evidence, Rips 
(1975) found that the similarity of the evidence to the 
conclusion influences its relevance. People are more willing 
to generalize the attribution of a property from a robin to a 
sparrow than from an eagle to a sparrow because robins and 
sparrows are more similar. Models of induction involving 
positive evidence have tried to capture this intuition. The 
similarity coverage model for instance uses the maximum 
similarity between premises and conclusion as one 
component to their model (Osherson et al., 1990). Similarly 
Sloman’s (1993) feature model uses the overall match in the 
number of features between the premises and the conclusion 
as a determinant of argument strength. The SimProb model 
(Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007) turns similarity between 
premises and conclusion into probabilities and uses those to 
determine argument strength.  
The question we are addressing here is where similarity 
also determines the relevance of negative evidence. If 
similarity functions in the same way for positive and 
negative evidence in determining whether a piece of 
evidence is considered to be relevant to the conclusion, then 
existing models of induction based on similarity should be 
able to handle arguments involving negative evidence. To 
our knowledge, the SimProb model (Blok, Medin, & 
Osherson, 2007) is the only model explicitly designed to 
handle negative evidence. Other models require some 
adaptation to handle the intuition that the belief in a 
proposition should decrease with the encounter of negative 
evidence.  
A second question of importance when modeling 
induction is how to combine the evidence. One approach 
might be to simply add to argument strength for positive 
evidence and subtract for negative evidence. Alternatively 
as the SimCov (Osherson et al., 1990) and the SimProb 
model (Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007) suggest, one could 
assign the greatest importance to one premise by virtue of 
its similarity to the conclusion for instance and adjust the 
resulting argument strength in accordance with the 
remaining evidence. Furthermore the manner in which the 
second premise exerts its influence can be implemented in 
different ways. The SimProb model suggests a weighting by 
similarity to the first premise. The SimCov model uses the 
relative positions of the premise categories in a conceptual 
similarity space to determine the influence of additional 
premises. These are only a few examples of the various 
possibilities to combine data, but they highlight the 
complexity of the issue.  
The aim here is to test whether similarity based models of 
induction are able to handle negative evidence in a category-
based property induction task. We present data from an 
induction task involving single and double premise 
arguments with positive and negative evidence and fit three 
models. In the next section we’ll describe in more detail the 
three models used.  
Similarity-based models of induction 
We evaluated three models, each relying essentially on 
similarity to predict the strength of an argument. The 
models differ in how information is combined in arguments 
with two or more premises and in the implementation of 
negative evidence premises. The first model is a simple 
similarity based model (Sim). The second model is the 
similarity-coverage model (SimCov) as proposed by 
Osherson et al. (1990). In the present study, we adapted the 
model to account for negative evidence. The third model is 
the similarity-probability model (SimProb; Blok, Medin, & 
Osherson, 2007). 
The Sim model 
In this model the strength of the argument is directly related 
to the similarity of the conclusion category and the premise 
category (or categories). Formally, the argument strength Sc 
of an argument with conclusion c and a set of premises then 
is: 
 
 
where simcp is the similarity between the conclusion 
category and the category of premise p and ep indicates 
whether the premise is positive or negative (respectively 
ep=1 or ep=-1). Note that in this expression similarities are 
combined in a very straightforward manner, summing them 
(or subtracting, depending on whether it’s a positive or a 
negative premise) across the number of premises. 
The SimCov model 
In the SimCov model, the strength of an argument depends 
on two components. A similarity component captures the 
similarity between premise and conclusion categories, and 
thus the relevance of the premise. The coverage component 
captures the idea of how much of the nearest superordinate 
category containing both premise and conclusion categories 
is covered by the premise(s). We modified the model to 
account for negative evidence by making the similarity of a 
premise and a conclusion category negative when the 
premise is negative. 
Formally, the argument strength according to the SimCov 
model is a weighted sum of the similarity and the coverage 
component: 
 
 
 
where  α is a free parameter determining the relative weight 
of each component. The similarity component represents the 
similarity between premise and conclusion category. In case 
of multiple premises, the similarity component is equal to 
the premise category that is most similar to the conclusion 
category. As in the previous model, when the most similar 
premise category is in a negative premise, the similarity is 
negative. 
The coverage component is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
where i is an element of a relevant comparison set and N is 
the size of that set. The comparison set consists of known 
members of the nearest superordinate category containing 
both premise and conclusion categories. The coverage term 
implements the diversity principle (Carey, 1985). In a 
double positive premise argument, the more diverse the two 
premise categories are, the larger the coverage term will be 
– the more the nearest superordinate category is “covered” 
by the premise categories. Again, when the most similar 
premise category is in a negative premise, the similarity is 
negative in the expression. 
The SimProb model 
In the simprob model, inductive reasoning is considered as a 
conditional probability judgment. Given a certain prior 
belief about something, the evidence considered will update 
this prior belief. Formally, the belief update elicited by the 
premise a is given by: 
 
 
 
with 
 
 
 
When there are two premises, the most relevant premise a 
(the premise that would influence the prior belief the most) 
is combined with the lesser relevant premise in the 
following way: 
 
 
 
There are elegant symmetrical expressions to implement 
negative evidence (see Blok et al., 2007, for details). The 
basic idea is that the probability of a negative premise is 1 
minus the probability of the same but positive premise, and 
that similarity between two premises will raise the posterior 
probability of the conclusion instead of decreasing it. 
The SimProb model makes use of prior beliefs regarding 
the premises and conclusion. In the present study, we use 
blank properties. Following Blok et al., (2007) in their 
handling of blank properties, we use a uniform and low 
prior probability (fixed at .2) for all premises and 
conclusions. 
An obvious parallel between the three models is that they 
all rely heavily on similarity to account for argument 
strength. There are differences however, in how similarity is 
used and – for arguments with multiple premises – how 
premise information is combined. The Sim model simply 
adds and subtracts similarities in the multiple premise case. 
SimCov picks the most relevant premise based on similarity 
and discards the similarity of the other premise. SimProb 
picks the most relevant premise, updates the conclusion 
probability and then modifies the resulting probability 
according to the less dominant premises. 
Present research 
The primary goal of this study was to see whether models 
that use similarity as a determinant of relevance of the 
evidence are able to handle negative evidence. To that end, 
we first established what influence negative evidence has on 
argument strength. We then tested a simple similarity model 
(the Sim Model), that only takes similarity into account, the 
SimCov model (Osherson et al., 1990) that also considers 
the coverage of the conclusion category and the SimProb 
model (Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007), that was 
specifically designed to be able to handle negative evidence.  
The models are evaluated on data from a standard 
category-based property induction task using properties that 
participants are likely to have very little knowledge about. 
The properties are projected from either one or two 
exemplars to another exemplar of the same category. 
Participants are asked to judge how likely the conclusion is 
given the premises, for instance, how likely is it that 
magpies have a syrinx given that parakeets have a syrinx? 
The models are tested on four kinds of arguments:  
 
Single Positive: 
 Parakeets have a syrinx. 
 Magpies have a syrinx. 
 
Single Negative: 
 Parakeets do not have a syrinx. 
 Magpies have a syrinx. 
 
Double Positive: 
 Parakeets have a syrinx. 
 Penguins have a syrinx. 
 Magpies have a syrinx. 
 
Mixed Positive & Negative: 
 Parakeets have a syrinx. 
 Penguins do not have a syrinx. 
 Magpies have a syrinx. 
 
Note that in the mixed arguments, the negative premise was 
always the premise presented second.  
Method 
Participants  76 students from the University of Leuven, 
Belgium, participated in the study. Participants received 
course credits in return for participation.  
 
Design  Two groups of participants rated the inductive 
strength of 40 target and 14 filler arguments. Filler items 
were arguments that were clearly true or false. One group 
evaluated 20 single positive arguments and 20 mixed 
positive and negative premise arguments. Fillers for this 
group consisted of single and double positive arguments. 
The other group evaluated 20 single negative premise and 
20 double positive premises arguments with fillers being 
single positive and mixed positive and negative premises. 
The exemplars and properties used were identical for the 
two groups matching the characteristics across positive and 
negative arguments. 
 
Materials  To create arguments, we selected exemplars 
from four animal categories (i.e., birds, fish, insects & 
mammals) from the Leuven Concept Norms (DeDeyne, et 
al., 2008). For each category, the norms contain exemplars 
generated by participants as well as pair-wise similarity 
ratings between them. The norms also contain typicality 
ratings for each exemplar. Exemplars of the two premises 
and the conclusion were matched for typicality across the 
single and double premise arguments. The to-be-projected 
properties were biologically plausible blank properties. For 
each animal category we selected five kinds of 
characteristics (i.e., anatomical, behavioral, developmental, 
metabolic, necessity) that people were likely to have little 
knowledge about (e.g., Robins require amylase for their 
digestion). The task was administered in form of a 
questionnaire. The first page contained a description of the 
task with the instruction and an example argument. This was 
followed by 54 arguments starting with 3 warm-up fillers. 
The remaining 11 fillers were evenly distributed across the 
items. One random order of items and its reverse was used. 
 
Procedure The induction task was presented as part of a 
battery of test. Students participated in a large group and 
took no longer than 10 minutes to complete the task.  
Results 
Preliminary Analysis Five participants were excluded from 
the analysis due to a lack of variance in their responses. In a 
subsequent reliability analysis, the two groups showed high 
consistency in their responding (Cronbach’s alpha of .88 
and .95). The data were averaged across participants and 
subsequent analyses were carried out on the items.  
 
 
 
Manipulation Check  Each of the 40 target items appeared 
once with positive and once with negative evidence. Of 
these, 20 items were single premise and 20 were double 
premise arguments. Figure 1 shows the average argument 
strength across those four conditions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Argument strength for all four types of 
argument. Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
 
Arguments containing negative evidence (darker bars) 
were rated lower in argument strength than those with 
positive evidence. For positive and negative evidence, 
arguments having two premises increased argument 
strength. Note though that in the mixed positive-negative 
premise arguments the increase in argument strength is due 
to the addition of a positive rather than negative premise.  
The data were submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed factorial 
analysis of variance with type of evidence (contains 
negative evidence vs. does not contain negative evidence) as 
repeated measure and type of argument (single vs. double 
premise arguments) as between subjects factor. Although 
the data suggested that adding a positive premise has a 
greater effect if the first premise is positive as opposed to 
negative, the interaction between argument type and 
evidence type was not significant (F(1, 38) = 3.2, p = .08). 
Both main effects of type of evidence (F(1, 38) = 27.8, p < 
.001) and type of argument were significant (F(1, 38) = 
38.3, p = .001). Single negative premise arguments were 
rated weaker than single positive premise arguments (t(19) 
= 2.2, p < .05). Similarly mixed positive-negative premise 
arguments were judged less strong than those with two 
positive premises (t(19) = 5.9, p < .05). Adding a positive 
premise to either a positive (t(38) = 5.2, p < .05) or a 
negative premise (t(38) = 2.1, p = .05) increased argument 
strength.  
The data confirmed the intuition that negative evidence 
should have an adverse effect on argument strength. 
Arguments involving negative evidence were rated lower 
than those with positive evidence. For positive evidence, we 
also found a monotonicty effect (Nisbett, et al., 1983); more 
premises led to stronger arguments.  
 
Modeling preliminaries  In order to evaluate the model 
fits, we use the correlation between the averaged observed 
and predicted argument strength within each condition. To 
derive predicted values from the models, we extracted pair-
wise similarity ratings between items from the Leuven 
Concept Norms (De Deyne, et al., 2008). Although the 
SimProb model provides predicted values in terms of 
conditional probabilities the other two models do not and 
we therefore do not make any claims about the scales of the 
predicted values and will not discuss differences between 
the models in those terms.  
In terms of model parameters, the Sim model does not 
contain any parameters. The SimCov model uses the alpha 
parameter to determine the relative influence of its two 
components (i.e., the similarity component and the coverage 
component). Figure 2 presents model fits (i.e., correlations 
between predicted and observed) across the whole range of 
the alpha parameter. In all four conditions a reduction in the 
alpha parameter led to a reduction in fit indicating that the 
coverage term did not play a role. Consequently we fixed 
the alpha parameter at 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model fits plotted against the whole range of the 
alpha parameter of the SimCov model in each condition. 
 
 
The SimProb model requires prior probability judgments 
for the properties as input parameter to the model. 
Nevertheless, Blok et al. (2007) suggest that the SimProb 
model can handle arguments containing blank properties. 
They recommend using uniform and low prior probabilities, 
as this will ensure that the similarity component of their 
model will do most of the work. We therefore opted for 
uniform priors across premises and conclusion of .2.  
 
  
 
Figure 3: Scatter plots of observed against predicted for each model across single positive, single negative, double positive 
and mixed positive-negative argument. 
 
 
Modeling results  Figure 3 shows the scatter plots of the 
predicted versus observed values for each of the three 
models (columns) across the four types of argument (rows). 
All correlation coefficients were significant at p < .05 with n 
= 20. For single positive premises arguments (top row), the 
three models showed virtually identical results with a good 
fit of r = .74 for all three models. Looking at single premise 
arguments with negative evidence (2nd row), the models 
were equally capable at predicting participants’ responses 
and even showed a better fit (r = .85). There was no 
difference in model predictions or fit across the three 
models. Thus for single premise arguments the three models 
can equally well account for argument strength involving 
positive and negative evidence.  
The third row shows that for double positive premise 
arguments the three models differed in their predictions. The 
Sim model showed a somewhat weaker fit (r = .53) than the 
SimCov (r = .61) or the SimProb (r = .62) models. 
Applying a t-test to the Fisher’s Z transformed correlation 
coefficients however showed that the difference was not 
significant (t(17) = .56, n.s.). Overall the fit of the models 
for double positive premise arguments was not as good as 
for single premise arguments. 
Testing the fit for mixed positive and negative premise 
arguments (4th row) we find no difference between the 
models in terms of the correlation coefficient (Sim: r = .75; 
SimCov: r = .73; SimProb: r = .73). However the 
scatterplot shows that the SimCov model, unlike the other 
two, predicts two separate clouds of data points across the 
range of observed values. The human data clearly showed a 
continuous distribution across the whole range of possible 
values without two separate clouds.  The difference in 
overall mean of each cloud in the predicted data seems to 
drive the correlation. This is due to the max function in the 
similarity component choosing the premise (positive or 
negative) that has the greater similarity and dropping the 
influence of the other premise. In contrast the Sim model 
and the SimProb model take both premises into account.  
General Discussion 
In making an inference, we have to determine whether a 
piece of information is relevant or not. For evidence in favor 
of our inference, theories of induction (Blok, Medin, & 
Osherson, 2007; Osherson, et al., 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 
1993) have suggested that the relevance is determined by 
the similarity between the evidence and the conclusion. In 
everyday reasoning, however, we often face at least some 
evidence that is not in line with our favored conclusion. 
Here we have tested whether models that use similarity to 
determine relevance are able to handle arguments involving 
negative evidence.  
The model fits showed that for single premise arguments 
all three models were able to account for the data from both 
positive and negative premise arguments equally well. This 
indicates that the relevance of negative evidence can also be 
modeled using similarity. For double premise arguments all 
three models did a decent job with positive evidence. 
However, for mixed positive–negative premise arguments 
only the Sim and the SimProb model were able to account 
for the data. Although showing a good fit in terms of the 
correlation coefficient, the SimCov model showed a pattern 
of predicted values not reflected in human data. Taken 
together, two factors can account for the behavior of the 
SimCov model. First, with our data the coverage component 
of the SimCov model did not contribute to the prediction of 
argument strength. One reason for this might be that the 
generalizations in our arguments were to other exemplars 
rather than the category itself. Second, the similarity 
component only takes into consideration the most similar 
premise disregarding the other. If this happens to be the 
negative one, predicted values are low. Conversely if the 
max function selects the positive premise predicted values 
are high. Without an influence of the coverage terms two 
clusters of predicted values emerge.  
The results from the double premise arguments again 
support the fact that similarity can be used to determine the 
relevance of negative just as well as positive evidence. 
However the results highlight that with several pieces of 
evidence it becomes important to consider how to model the 
combination of both positive and negative evidence. 
Differences in how the models combine the evidence make 
them better or worse candidates in modeling negative 
evidence with multiple premises. Disregarding one piece of 
evidence over another clearly does not resemble participants 
responses. However similarly a simple additive model like 
the Sim model becomes less realistic in the case of multiple 
premises of the same kind, evident in our double positive 
condition.  
The aim of the present study was not to provide a new 
model of induction but to test whether similarity-based 
models of induction can handle arguments involving 
negative evidence. We have shown that similarity can 
indeed be used to model relevance of negative evidence. In 
addition, our data highlight the importance of taking all 
evidence into account. Models of induction that try to 
account for the influence of negative evidence will need 
have a specific mechanism to combine positive and negative 
evidence.  
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